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The Louisiana Lottery-Supreme Court Style: A Look at
State v. Simpson' and its Constitutional Mandate of
Random Allotment of Criminal Court Cases Within a
District
Criminal defense attorneys, in their infinite struggle to find new
procedural infirmities, have struck gold in a recent Louisiana Supreme
Court opinion. The procedural loophole unearthed by the court is valuable to defense attorneys because it strikes at the precepts of the court's
involvement in criminal adjudication, that is, how the criminal cases
are allocated among the different divisions of a judicial district. No
longer do district attorneys have the luxury of setting the criminal dockets.
of each division within a district. Now rather, criminal cases, like civil
cases, must be allocated by lot to the different judges within each district.
In a short per curiam opinion, State v. Simpson (Simpson H), ' the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that due process requires capital and
other felony cases to be "allotted for trial to the various divisions of
the court, or to judges assigned criminal court duty, on a random or
rotating basis or under some other procedure adopted by the court which
does not vest the district attorney with power to choose the judge to
whom a particular case is assigned." 3 In other words, any Louisiana
trial court system whereby the district attorney has any discretion whatsoever over which judge within a district is assigned a capital or felony
case is "facially unfair ' 4 and violates due process.'
When the dust settled and the smoke cleared, it appeared that the
Simpson 11 decision espoused a very equitable rule. In fact, at first
glance, it seems only fair that the district attorney not be allowed to
choose the judge to preside over a felony or capital case. The problem,
however, is that the Simpson H rule was not fully thought out and
thus, not fully developed, leaving some Louisiana judicial districts with
fragmented criminal systems. The main criticism of the rule laid down

Copyright 1992, by LoUtSLNA LAW REvmw.
1. 551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1989) (hereinafter referred to as Simpson H as this is the
supreme court's opinion on rehearing. The original opinion is hereinafter referred to as
Simpson 1).
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id. at 1304.
Id.
Further, the court in Simpson H1 also held that in order to meet due process

requirements the criminal court dockets within each district must indicate the order in
which cases are to be called for trial on a particular day. Id. at 1305.
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in Simpson II was that though it was seemingly fair, it was perhaps
not based on the proper authority. In Simpson II, the supreme court
based random allocation of criminal cases on the due process requirement
of the Louisiana and United States constitutions. Due process requires
a fair tribunal. Since the criminal justice system is presumably based
on all tribunals being fair and impartial, how can due process be violated
by selective allocation of a criminal case to a certain court within a
district? The allocation of cases within a district should perhaps instead
be left to each judicial district or uniformly set out by the Louisiana
Legislature rather than being based on some nebulous due process test.
This casenote will attempt to analyze the first and second Simpson
opinions as well as other related jurisprudence. Further, inquiry shall
be made into the potential practical problems of the Simpson II rule.
And finally, this note will provide more acceptable alternatives to the
Simpson II rationale.
I.

PRE-SIMPSON

The constitutionality of allotment of criminal court cases within a
district was first raised in the 1988 court of appeal case State v. Authement. 6 In an otherwise unrelated case, the court in Authement noted
in a footnote that one of the defendant's twenty-three assignments of
error was that the court lacked jurisdictionbecause of improper allotment
of criminal cases. 7 The issue was never decided, however, because the
court reversed the convictions on other grounds.' The Authement case
thus planted a seed of doubt in many defense attorneys' minds concerning
the constitutionality of a judicial district system whereby the judge who
will preside over a felony or capital case is not selected randomly. 9
The allotment issue was presented again in State v. Tassin,10 a case
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court. However, the issue was skirted
for the second time because the court's discussion of the propriety of
the allotment procedures was put in an appendix not designated for
publication, and therefore, does not appear in the official reporters for

6. 532 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
7. Id. at 871 n.3(3)(b). Note that subsequent cases do not assert lack of jurisdiction
because of improper allotment, but rather unconstitutionality under due process standards.
8. Id. at 871-72.
9. It is unknown exactly how the thirty-second judicial district allotted its criminal
cases at the time of the alleged impropriety. The local court rules for the thirty-second
judicial district court applicable at the time provided for a random lottery allotment of
civil court cases. See Louisiana Rules of Court, State, Rules of the Thirty-second Judicial
District Court, Rule 2 (West 1988). The Rules had no provisions concerning the allotment
of criminal court cases within the district.
10. 536 So. 2d 402 (La. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S. Ct. 205 (1989).
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all to see." Tassin did not deal directly with normal allotment procedure;
rather, the issue came up upon reallotment of criminal cases after two
divisions of the Louisiana Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court were
removed from the allotment pool. The defendant's case was originally
allotted to division "B" of the twenty-fourth judicial district court.
However, when the court amended its local rules to take division "B"
out of the allotment system, the defendant's case had to be reallotted
to a different division. All division "B" cases involving defendants who
were incarcerated at the time of the amendment were automatically
assigned to division "J." All other division "B" cases were allocated
by random drawing. The defendant in Tassin had been automatically
reallocated to division "J" because he was incarcerated at the time. He
objected, claiming the non-random allotment of his case violated the
Equal Protection Clause of both the United States and Louisiana constitutions. 2 The court in this unpublished appendix held that the Constitution was not violated because "no matter which division the case
was allotted to, it would still have been decided by a jury drawn from
the general venue."' 3 Citing no authority and giving no reasoning other
than in the above cited quote, the court summarily rejected the defendant's claim. Apparently, the rationale was that the system of allotment
of the judge to the case was irrelevant because the defendant's right to
a jury trial with a jury drawn from the general venue was met in any
case.

14

Several months after Tassin, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal confronted the constitutionality of a non-random allotment procedure for criminal cases within the Louisiana Fifteenth Judicial District
Court." In State v. Trahan, a case which the Louisiana Supreme Court
would later overrule in Simpson 11,16 the court of appeal upheld the
trial court's denial of defendant's "motion for random allotment." The
defendant argued that the system used to allocate criminal cases within
the fifteenth judicial district court was inherently unfair because it allowed the prosecution to "'forum shop' for a sympathetic trial judge."',
II. Although the appendix is not published in the official reporters, it is available
at the end of the opinion on Westlaw.
12. Tassin, 536 So. 2d at 402. Note again that the defendant's claim here was not
the same as the claim found in Simpson. The defendant here argued a violation of his
equal protection rights as opposed to Simpson's due process claim.
13. Id.
14. Tassin is clearly inconsistent with a broad reading of the results and reasoning
found in the Simpson decision to be discussed later in this note.
15. State v. Trahan, 543 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), overruled by State v.
Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1989), modified and aff'd by State v. Trahan, 576 So.
2d I (La. 1990).
16. Simpson, 551 So. 2d at 1304. In footnote 3 the court held that State v. Trahan
was overruled insofar as it conflicted with the Simpson order.
17. Trahan, 543 So. 2d at 989.
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The fifteenth judicial district court at the time of Trahan and Simpson
I and II, also a fifteenth judicial district court case, had no published
local rule of court providing for allocation of criminal cases.' 8 However,
unofficially, the understanding was that the coordinator for the district
attorney's office would set the case on the docket which would be most
efficient. 9
In Trahan, a well-reasoned third circuit opinion, the court, addressing
the defendant's statutory argument, held that the allocation of criminal
cases within each judicial district is purely procedural. The third circuit
correctly noted that as to procedural matters in cases before a district
court each judicial district is expressly empowered by statute to adopt
local rules for the conduct of business in civil as well as criminal cases.30
The court did acknowledge that this rule is not absolute, however. The
district court's express right to adopt local rules as to procedural matters
before it is limited if there is "specific legislative procedural rules to
the contrary." 2 ' Therefore, unless the legislature had created a uniform
requirement for allocation of criminal cases within a judicial district,
which they had not, then each judicial district was statutorily empowered
to create any allocation procedures it deemed effective; even if that
procedure was to leave the allocation up to the district attorney. As
for the possibility of a constitutional violation, the third circuit found
nothing on the record which showed that the allotment system in any
way denied the defendant any constitutional rights. Therefore, the court
dismissed this assignment of error.
The third circuit noted in Trahan that the fifteenth judicial district
court, because it was made up of eleven judges rotating between three
parishes, had opted not to implement a rule for random allotment of
criminal cases, because random allotment would limit the district attorney's statutory right to decide when a case is prosecuted. The third
circuit implied that the district attorney's statutory right to decide when
a case is prosecuted comes from Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
article 61, which provides: "The district attorney shall have entire charge
and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his
district, and determines whom, when, and how he shall prosecute."

18. See Louisiana Rules of Court, State, Rules of the Fifteenth Judicial District Court

(West 1989).
19. This information was elicited from the coordinator for the district attorney of
the fifteenth judicial district court and was affirmed as of the publication of this note.
20. State v. Trahan, 543 So. 2d 984, 989 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989). See La. R.S.
13:472 (1983), which states that "[elach district court may adopt rules for the conduct
of business before it." See also La. Code Crim. P. art. 18, which states, "A court may
adopt rules for the conduct of criminal proceedings before it."
21. Trahan, 543 So. 2d at 989. See also State v. Eros Cinema, 262 La. 706, 264
So. 2d 615 (1972).
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From a strict reading of article 61, however, it seems the third circuit
misconstrued the right which the district attorney is given. Article 61
appears to mean, given its fair import, that the district attorney is given
full discretion as to when he files a bill of information or when he
indicts on behalf of the state, but not the right and discretion as to
when the judicial branch shall actually hear the case. However, overlooking this misstatement, the gist of the third circuit's opinion is
plausible in that the allotment of cases within the district is procedural,
and as such, it can be provided for as the district
court sees fit, even
'2
if the court leaves it to the district attorney.
More importantly, the third circuit in Trahan noted what was later
to be a fundamental weakness of the Simpson II rationale. If the
defendant's concern is that the trial judge is somehow biased to the
extent he could not "conduct a fair and impartial trial," 3 the state
provides the defendant a remedy elsewhere. The defendant has at his
access the right to file a motion to recuse under Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 671 as the appropriate remedy for a biased
or prejudiced judge.24 Under this reasoning, it is hard to accept an
argument that a defendant has been denied a fair and impartial trial
-because the judge within the district was not randomly allotted the
defendant's case. The judicial system of criminal justice is premised on
the assumption that the judiciary is neutral, and if for some reason a
particular division is not neutral, the defendant has a right to have the
judge of that division recuse himself. Therefore, as will be alluded to
later, there is a statutory remedy for a defendant's argument regarding
prejudice of a judge, no matter what the allocation procedure is.
II.

SIMPSON I AND MOUNTING PROBLEMS

The sound reasoning found in the third circuit's Trahan opinion
would prove to be short lived, however. " Two months after Trahan
was decided by the third circuit, the supreme court handed down the
first Simpson (Simpson 1) decision.16 This one-paragraph decision merely
held that the case was remanded to the fifteenth judicial district court,
which must reassign the case under a method of allotment which does

22. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The more accurate authority, however,
is La. R.S. 13:472 (1983) and La. Code Crim. P. art. 18, and not La. Code Crim. P.
art. 61.
23. Trahan, 543 So. 2d at 990.
24. Id.
25. The portion of the third circuit opinion which dealt with the constitutionality of
the method of allotment of criminal cases was overruled in State v. Trahan, 576 So. 2d
1, 5 (La. 1990) and State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1304 n.3 (La. 1989).
26. State v. Simpson, 545 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1989).

1290

0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

not allow the district attorney to select the judge and under a system
2
where the trial dates are approved by the court. 1
This opinion proved to be very confusing. The local court rules at
the time provided no method of allocation of criminal matters between
the different divisions of the fifteenth judicial district. The district attorney's office, which had been vested with the authority by the court
to set the court's criminal case dockets so that criminal cases could be
efficiently and expeditiously disposed of, now was left with no way to
get a case to trial before prescriptive periods ran. Therefore, the Simpson
I decision left the district attorney in an impossible position: needing
cases to be set on the court's dockets before prescription ran, yet being
told to keep his hands off the court's dockets.
After Simpson 1, yet prior to the supreme court's rehearing opinion
in Simpson (Simpson If), the third circuit was once again faced with a
defendant who claimed that the allocation procedures of the fifteenth
judicial district court were unconstitutional. 8 In State v. Romero, the
defendant argued that because the fifteenth judicial district court had
a random allotment set up for civil cases, it was unconstitutional not
to use the same allocation procedure for criminal cases. The third circuit
in another well-written opinion did its best to work around what the
supreme court had said in Simpson I, knowing full well that soon the
supreme court would be elaborating on that holding in the rehearing
which it had granted. 9 Having decided to take the bull by the horns
and not to punt this case in the direction of the upcoming Simpson H
decision, the third circuit gave another very insightful opinion. It held
that if the supreme court in Simpson H was to find the method of
allotment in the fifteenth judicial district unconstitutional and that that
decision should be applied retroactively, any error which occurred as a
result of the unconstitutionality should be considered harmless error. 0
A harmless error under Code of Criminal Procedure article 921 is
one which does not affect the substantial rights of the accused. The
only substantial right in question would be the right to a fair tribunal

27. Id.
28. State v. Romero, 552 So. 2d 45, 48 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559
So. 2d 137 (1990).
29. Id. at 49. See State v. Simpson, 548 So. 2d 1213 (La. 1989).
30. Romero, 552 So. 2d at 490. The court noted that the defendant showed no actual
prejudice in this case caused by the method of allotment found in the fifteenth judicial
district. It seems that the third circuit is implying that the court system in the United
States is based upon the presumption that the judiciary is neutral. Therefore, if the
defendant has any reason to believe he will be prejudiced by having to go before any
particular judge, he must file a motion of recuse. That is procedural remedy for a
defendant who, for any reason, believes he is not being tried in an impartial tribunal.
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with a neutral decision maker.3" Since all courts are presumed to be
fair and impartial, it would seem that no substantial right of the accused
was affected and thus any error must be considered harmless. Further,
the third circuit correctly opined that if the defendant thought the judge
was not neutral, then he should hav6 submitted a motion to recuse the
judge. Without such a motion, nothing on the record would be able to
show that the judge was not actually impartial, thus any error which
may have occurred would again be harmless and should not result in
a reversal of a conviction. 2
III. STATE V. SIMPSON; SIMPSON II
Faced with mounting problems and conflicting jurisprudence on the
subject, the supreme court reheard Simpson I and handed down an
opinion which appears equitable but is nevertheless difficult to support."
In Simpson II, the supreme court held that due process of law requires
capital and other felony cases to be "allotted for trial to the various*
divisions of the Court, or to judges assigned criminal court duty, on a
random or rotating basis or some other procedure adopted by the Court
which does not vest the district attorney with power to choose the judge
to whom a particular case is assigned. '3 4 The court cited no authority
for this proposition other than the right of a defendant to have a fair
trial in a fair tribunal."
The Simpson II opinion is very problematic. One problem, as the
third circuit suggested several times in its line of cases on the subject,
is that if a person feels he is not in a fair tribunal, he should use a
motion to recuse, which is the statutory remedy for such a problem.
A second problem, if Simpson II is read broadly, is that the court
seems to hold that it is due process which requires random allotment.
However, such is not the case. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held
that the Louisiana Constitution does not provide greater due process
rights than those found in the Federal Constitution, 6 and, several federal
court of appeals cases have found that lack of randomness of allotment
of criminal cases does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Federal
Constitution.37 One using deductive reasoning can fairly say, therefore,

31. This idea of a neutral detached decision maker is a creature of case law. See
Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891, 901 (La. 1985).
32. Romero, 552 So. 2d at 49.
33. State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1989).
34. Id. at 1304.
35. Id. (citing Turner v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546 (1965) as
support for that position).
36. State v. Griffin, 495 So. 2d 1306, 1310 (La. 1986).
37. U.S. v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1989). But cf. Cruz v. Abbate,
812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
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that lack of random allotment of criminal cases would not violate the
due process clause of the Louisiana Constitution. Further, the selection
of the judge to preside over a criminal case is purely a matter of judicial
administration," and the defendant has no vested rights in court procedure.3 9 To infer from either constitution that a defendant has a constitutional right to have a judge picked by lot to preside over his case
seems illogical. This writer is of the opinion that although a random
allotment of criminal cases seems to be the more fair system, neither
the Louisiana nor the Federal Constitution requires such. In light of
this rationale, Simpson 11 must only be given its narrowest interpretation;
that is, that while random allotment is not constitutionally mandated,
due process nevertheless prevents the district attorney from allocating
criminal cases to the different divisions of each district.
Simpson II says in no uncertain terms that vesting in the district
attorney the power to choose the judge under which a criminal case
will be heard violates due process. It also'seems to say, when given a
broad interpretation, that the allocation procedure must be random.
However, Tassin, the earlier supreme court case, 40 may be strong support
for limiting Simpson to a narrow interpretation. Recall that Tassin
implied that because one always has the right to a jury drawn from
the general venue, the system of non-random allotment of judges to
the cases was irrelevant. The only way these two cases can be reconciled
is by reading Simpson narrowly to say that while random allocation of
criminal cases is not mandated by the Constitution, non-participation
of the district attorney is. By this narrow approach to Simpson, Tassin
remains good law and the Simpson 11 decision itself is subject to much
less criticism about its overreaching effect.
IV.

POST-SIMPSON

II;

THE AFTERMATH

In the wake of Simpson II came several cases striking down other
districts' methods of allotment. First to fall was the allotment procedure
found in the twenty-first judicial district in State v. Payne,4 a supreme
court case. After Simpson II, the twenty-first judicial district amended
its allocation procedures. However, it still allowed the district attorney
to motion the court to set a particular trial date if necessary. In Payne,
the supreme court held that even the most modified rules do not comply
with Simpson I1 if the district attorney has any discretion at all to pick

38. Cruz, 812 F.2d at 574.
39. State v. Clark, 340 So. 2d 208, 220 (La. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Clark v.
Louisiana, 430 U.S. 936, 97 S. Ct. 1563 (1977).

40.
41.

See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
556 So. 2d 47 (La. 1990).
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a judge to preside over a criminal case.' 2 And, the court found that
the district attorney had such discretion where he had the power to
make unchecked motions for certain 4trial
dates knowing in advance
3
which judges were to be at the bench.
The supreme court in Payne also dispelled any thoughts that after
Simpson II, Code of Criminal Procedure article 61, which grants the
district attorney entire charge and control over every criminal proceeding
in his district and the right to determine where, when, and how he shall
prosecute, was unconstitutional. Rather, the court held that due process
is only violated when the district attorney can in some way choose the
judge before whom a criminal matter will go. Thus, Article 61 does
not violate due process because it only allows district attorneys to control
criminal proceedings generally."
The next district to have its method of allotment of criminal cases
struck down under Simpson II was the eighteenth judicial district court
in State v. Gomez.4 According to a per curiam opinion by Judge
Marionneaux, a trial judge within the eighteenth judicial district, that
district had an unpublished procedure for allocation of criminal matters.
The district consists of three parishes and four divisions. Therefore, on
a rotating basis, each division would sit on a felony bench in each of
the three parishes and then serve the fourth term on an arraignment
and misdemeanor bench for all three parishes. The judge serving as the
arraignment and misdemeanor bench would confer with the district
attorney six months prior to his taking the arraignment bench and,
together, they would create a criminal court docket for the time he will
be serving on the arraignment bench. The schedule is then submitted
to the other divisions for approval. After approval, the district attorney
on arraignment day moves to have each trial set for the date noticed
on the proposed docket." The first circuit held that this gave the district
attorney control over which judge would preside over a criminal case,
thus violating the mandates of Simpson H1.47
The court in Gomez faced a tenable argument by the state that the
defendant can forum shop as well as the district attorney can if the
defendant chooses to move for a continuance.4 This, in addition to a
motion for recusal, is another potential statutory remedy for a defendant
who feels that he is not before a neutral court. The court, however,

42.
43.

Id. at 47-48.
Id.at 48.

44. Id.
45. 573 So. 2d 521 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990).
46. Id. at 524.
47. Id.at 523.
48. Id.
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did not address the argument directly, but rather glossed over it by
relying per se on the Simpson 11 case.
V.

SIMpsoN II; THE FALLOUT

Surprisingly, the most recent cases in which Simpson 11 violations
were alleged seem to revert back to the third circuit's logic as found
in Trahan49 and Romero,3 0 and away from that found in Simpson I and
Simpson II. In State v. Kimmel,5 ' the defendant filed a pretrial motion
for reallocation of the case to comply with Simpson 11. The trial court
denied the motion. The trial court also denied the defendant's motion
to stay the proceeding for application for a writ to the supreme court
based on the Simpson II ruling. The case was tried as allocated and
the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant alleged that he
was denied due process because the allotment procedures of the fourteenth judicial district court did not comply with Simpson II. The third
circuit refused to reverse the conviction because it found that any error
which may have occurred in the allocation of the case must be harmless
under Code of Criminal Procedure article 921.5 , This is because the
court found that here, as in Romero, where the defendant has not
sought to recuse the judge, then the record can show no bias and the
3
error must be considered harmless .
4
In State v. Montgomery,3 a 1991 decision, the third circuit court
again held that even if Simpson 11 is violated, when the defendant does
not seek a motion to recuse the judge, the error is harmless and the
conviction will not be reversed.
What does all this mean? In a nutshell, it seems that the Supreme
Court of Louisiana wanted to impose a system of random allotment of
criminal cases on the various districts within Louisiana or at the least
to remove the power of the district attorney to have some input on the
allocation procedure. However, because this is a subject of procedure
which most feel is properly left to the individual districts or the legislature, subsequent courts have sought to avoid the result desired. The
latest cases in effect say the defendant must file a motion to recuse or

49. State v. Trahan, 543 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), where the third circuit
held that the remedy for a biased tribunal is a motion to recuse.
50. State v. Romero, 552 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So.
2d 137 (1990), where the third circuit held thai no matter what Simpson actually holds,

a defendant should never get his conviction overturned based on Simpson if he does make
a pretrial motion to recuse and has it denied.
51. 571 So. 2d 208 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
52. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
53. Kimmel, 571 So. 2d at 210.
54. 575 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
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else there can be no showing of prejudice and any Simpson 11 violation
is harmless.
One problem with the third circuit's interpretation, however, is if
the defendant does file a motion to recuse, it will likely be denied if
it is only based on the fact that the case was not randomly allotted
because a judge is under no obligation to recuse himself unless he has
a reason to show bias against the defendant. Further, it would be
ridiculous for a court to grant a motion to recuse based on non-random
allotment yet at the same time to deny pretrial motions for reallotment
based on Simpson 11 as the court did in Kimmel. If the defendant
decides to seek a supervisory writ to the supreme court on a denial of
a pretrial motion, based on a Simpson H1 violation, the trial court need
only deny any stay of proceedings request and dispose of the case; then
on appeal, the court will ask if a motion to recuse was filed. If not,
then its harmless error; if so, there will still likely be no error if the
trial judge chose not to recuse himself based strictly upon defendant's
claim that the trial judge is biased because he was not randomly chosen.
So it seems courts need only give lip service to the Simpson 11
requirements if they would rather not change their allotment procedures.
Of course, the supreme court could stop this bypass of Simpson H by
lower courts if it simply overruled Kimmel and held that the filing of
pretrial motions for reallotment are alone sufficient to preserve the issue
of bias because of lack of random allotment for appeal purposes where
a motion to recuse is lacking, but as of yet they have not done so.
Of course, Simpson H has caused some districts to adopt an entirely
random allotment procedure for criminal cases. In January of 1990, the
fifteenth judicial district court, which was the district that spawned
Trahan, Simpson, and several other major cases in this area, amended
its allotment procedures for criminal cases." Now criminal cases are
fixed and assigned to courtroom dockets. Only when the dockets for
the upcoming criminal court sessions are completed and finalized are
the judges chosen by lot to sit in each designated courtroom.', This
procedure has been approved by the supreme court in that it does
7
comply with Simpson H requirements.
VI.

PROBLEMS WITH SIMPSON I

Random allotment in practice, however, causes some undesired results. Many judicial district courts had always allowed the district attorney to choose the criminal trial dates because the courts felt that the
district attorney was the only one who knew about each case and how

55.
56.
57.

Local Rules of the Fifteenth Judicial District Court.
Id.
State v. Simpson, 565 So. 2d 427 (La. 1990).
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soon it needed to go to trial. The idea was that the district attorney
was in the best position to set the criminal trial docket so that each
defendant was assured a constitutionally required speedy and efficient
trial. Further, if the presiding judge over a criminal case was immediately
known, then all pretrial motions for a particular case could be heard
by the same judge resulting in consistent rulings and more familiarity
with the case prior to ruling on such pretrial motions.
Now, in districts where there is a random allotment of criminal
cases as in the fifteenth judicial district, the district attorney loses his
ability to be a watchdog over speedy trial rights. For example, if an
offender is arrested for a felony violation and a bill of information is
filed, under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 578, the trial
must be commenced within two years of the date of the institution of
the prosecution. The district attorney no longer has the ability to ensure
that the trial is actually set on the docket to commence within that
prescriptive period. All he can do is file his bill of information and
hope that the trial is set on the docket in time.
Another more difficult problem to correct is where pretrial motions
in a case go before a judge other than the one who will ultimately hear
the case. Since in the random allotment scheme where judges rotate
there is no way to determine which judge will preside over a given
criminal case, any pretrial motions made prior to the random assignment
of judges to a docket must go before whichever judge happens to be
on the bench the day the motion goes to hearing. The result is that a
judge who is unfamiliar with a case and its history must make a decision
on a motion in that case. This may seem "facially fair," but it is not
efficient and may lead to inconsistent results. For example, the original
Simpson case itself, when reassigned by random allotment, went before
eleven different judges in the fifteenth judicial district on different
pretrial motions." This means that eleven judges with different levels
of knowledge of the case made rulings on the case. This is an inefficient
procedure and potentially leads to inconsistent rulings.
VII.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO SIMPSON II

PROBLEMS

What are the alternatives to the supreme court's method of imposing
random allotment of criminal cases? It is this writer's opinion that the
court should recant what it said in Simpson II and let the districts retain
their authority to provide for the procedural methods within their districts
as they see fit. If the district finds that the best way to ensure efficient,
effective criminal dockets is to leave the allotment of criminal cases to
the district attorney, so be it. One should not forget that the Louisiana

58.

Id.
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Supreme Court has recognized, albeit in an appendix not for publication,
that the capital and felony cases involved here are going to go before
a neutral jury if the defendant so desires.59 Therefore, the randomness
of the judge in a jury trial is not as important as it would be if the
judge were the ultimate fact finder. The system that was in place
previously worked effectively for decades; it is unfortunate that such a
relatively smooth system must be disrupted because it "appears unfair."
Another possible alternative is a legislative amendment or statute
providing for random allotment of criminal cases among the divisions
of a given district. Although the same problems which were caused by
Simpson II would still be prevalent initially, there would at least be a
uniform procedure set up for each type of district, rotating or nonrotating, which would be open to widespread scrutiny and change. In
such a case, all the districts could propose changes to the statute to
benefit all until a practical workable procedure was found.
The last alternative is a different approach to supporting the Simpson
M decision. It would seem to be an ethical violation under the Louisiana
State Bar Association Rules of Professional Conducts for a prosecutor
to have control over the court's criminal docket. It appears that the
district attorney, who, in essence, has the state as a client, would clearly
be in violation of the ex parte communication prohibition of the rules
of professional conduct 6' if he collaborated with the judiciary and set
his case before a particular judge, assuming the district attorney contacted
the judge or his staff concerning the docket outside of the defendant's
presence. At the very least, the district attorney would appear to have
a conflict of interest between his duty to the state to prosecute alleged
criminal violators and his duty to the judiciary to impartially set the
criminal court dockets. It is at least tenable that if the district attorney
thought he may be subject to ethical violations, he would perhaps refuse
to take part in acting in concert with the court to set its criminal case
dockets. However, this approach may leave district attorneys afraid to
vehemently pursue convictions because of possible disbarment. A prosecution which would otherwise be timely brought to trial because the
district attorney would be careful to have it set on the court's docket
when necessary may prescribe because of the district attorney's fear of
losing his own job. Therefore, this approach to achieving the Simpson
IH results may be more harmful than beneficial.
In any event, until a uniform authoritative change is made, courts
will be able to effectively avoid Simpson II altogether, as seen in Kimmel

59. See State v. Tassin, 536 So. 2d 402 (La. 1988) and supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text.
60. See generally Louisiana State Bar Association, Rules of Professional Conduct.
La. R.S. 37: Ch. 4 Appendix, Art. 16.
61. Id. at Rule 3.5(b).
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and Montgomery, or to follow Simpson H1 to its most literal result as
in Gomez. In either case the taxpayers and the criminal defendants are
the losers. The taxpayers lose because they end up paying for the district
attorneys, indigent defenders, and judges to sort this thing out time and
time again. The defendants lose because they become pawns in a power
struggle between the different levels of the court system and between
the courts and legislature.
Mark A. Marionneaux

